Wei Jingsheng

The Comparison between Sino-Soviet Relations and the China-DPRK Relations


I read the micro-blogs by Mr. Mao Yushi online where he commented on the
CCTV historic program called"Unlock the Secret of the Sino-Soviet
Diplomatic Archives". The program selectively unlocked some contents from
the early era of the Sino-Soviet diplomatic relations, with vivid
descriptions of intrigues between the brothers of the Communist Parties.
What made Mr. Mao in particular resentful was that Stalin and Kim Il Sung
joined hands to deceive the Chinese Communist Party. They dragged China
into the quagmire of the Korean War, which wasted the lives of more than
one million people. That was a heinous crime.

But netizens' comments mainly were not on this. Instead, they noticed the
background for the introduction of this series: it is right at the time
when North Korea(DPRK) is subject to UN sanctions approved by both the
USA and China due to its nuclear test. This"coincidence" is a bit out of
line with the typical routine of the introduction of a TV series that
usually meets the Chinese Communist Party's propaganda effort. It could
be suspected this TV series is being used to explain China's difficult
position to the international society-- as its effort to illustrate that
the China-DPRK relation is pretty much the same as the Sino-Soviet
relation back then, that China could not control this little rogue of
North Korea.

If indeed there is the intention to use this program to illustrate the
China-DPRK relations, then this explanation is certainly fraudulent. The
Chinese Communist government does not have credit within China, nor has it
much credit internationally. If it tries to explain relations so
directly, the others would not believe it. So what to do? Fortunately,
the analysts in the USA mostly do not know China that well, even less so
North Korea. So by making this roundabout, they might to make their own
analysis, thus achieving the purpose of the fraud.

Why is this fraud? It is because there are fundamental differences
between the Sino-Soviet relations and the China-DPRK relations.

The first is their different dimensions. The Sino-Soviet relation was the
relationship between two big countries. The Soviet Union may have been
able to reach its goal through deceiving China, but not through forcing
China. Besides the intrigue, exchange in equality was the main part of
the Sino-USSR relationship. The large-scale aid from the Soviet Union to
China was on the condition that China ceded Outer Mongolia and chose a
foreign policy that was one-sided to the Soviet Union. Both considered
Stalin had the advantage, rather than China.

The second difference is their different roles. After deceiving China to
fight against the USA in North Korea, the Soviets could no longer to
instigate China to stir up trouble according to Soviet intention.
However, as a little brother that receives massive aid from China, North
Korea has to stir up trouble whenever the Chinese Party wants, even when
against its own interests at its own expense. Although privately it
certainly resents China, a little brother can only be in the role of a
little brother, because the big brother could strangle his neck anytime.
This is totally different that the previous Sino-Soviet relationship.

The third difference is the environment. Back then there was no opponent
in the peripheral region to China that directly threatened China. Even
the Kuomintang Army that had fled to Taiwan did not pose a threat to the
Chinese Communist regime. That is true to this day. But both the
national strength and the army of South Korea are now far stronger than
North Korea, especially with the help of the U.S. military. Further,
there is a ministerial level department in South Korea that others do not
have; the Ministry of Unification. This is in a gesture that is ready to
swallow the North at any time. So if North Korea abandons its alliance
with the Chinese Communists, it is equal to suicide.

Under these circumstances, if the Chinese government does not have the
intention to support a little rogue that has different interests, it has
the entire ability to compel North Korea not to stir up any more trouble.
However, right now it is not forcefully requiring North Korea to stop
making trouble, so it only illustrates that the Chinese government is
still where it was in the past-- what it hopes or needs North Korea to be
is a pawn of the Chinese diplomatic strategy: using it to continuously
stir up trouble to make a deal with the West.

But is this possible? These conditions might be in the past. With the
muddled thinking of a political counselor, Hu Jintao had quite a sense of
trust to North Korea that carried its autocracy without retreating
backwards. Also, then ruler Kim Jong-Il was fairly wise-- he would give
bragging talk of independence domestically, but be more moderate
externally and not allow fallout with the Chinese Communists. On
important issues, Kim Jong-Il would still listen to the covert command of
the Chinese Communist Party.

But the new Chinese leadership headed by Xi Jinping is no longer ideology
based Dopey. They have all personally experienced the ruthless autocracy,
as well as have seen the intrigues of the Communist brothers. They would
not be relenting to their little brother of the Communist Party unless
they are the stakeholders. However, Kim Jong-Un treats the independent
boast he saw when he was a kid as true, and now he is determined to
continue what his father and grandfather did not accomplish. It seems
that he is really ready for a fallout with the Chinese Communists, and
posturing with Communist China to play the American card.

As of now, it is unknown if the Americans are willing to be a toy for this
little rogue. But Communist China has already supported the resolution of
sanctions against North Korea in the United Nations, with a strong gesture
of falling out. However, obviously it has not given a powerful strike; it
still holds the illusion that Kim Jong-Un will turn around. In other
words, Xi Jinping still hopes to continuously use the little rogue to make
trouble for the security in East Asia. But apparently, Kim Jong-Un thinks
that his strategy to seek a balance between the major powers will be
successful. If the United States took the olive branch from Kim Jong-Un,
Xi Jinping's illusion will be awkwardly burst.

But could the United States be able to control a shameless villain without
credit such as North Korea? Americans have always been confident, and
often been relatively shortsighted. There is also the factor of South
Korea at work. It is destined to be unable to control this little brother
that is used to being the rogue. If the United States took over this
rogue state from the hands of China, it will become the bane of East Asian
security. The Chinese Communists still have a way to force this little
rogue to obey when necessary.

So do not believe that North Korea will fall out with a big country the
way China did with the Soviets back then. North Korea is not that
emboldened. Instead of Americans wrongfully spending money yet unable to
control this little rogue, it is better to have China to carry this
responsibility. Not only could China cut its aid to promote Kim Jong-Un's
downfall, it also could sent troops to North Korea in the pretext of
suppressing internal insurrection. Regardless whether little chubby Kim
is smart or confused, Communist China has a lot of ways to subdue him.
One should not let Communist China to shirk its responsibility so easily.

It appears that the unification of the Korean Peninsula is not in the
foreseeable future due to the confused South Koreans and weak Americans.
If the South Koreans only care about family ties instead of distinguishing
right from wrong, if South Korea does not support the people to overthrow
the dictatorship of the North Korean Communists, then regardless how loud
their unification slogans are, they could only be a hypocritical political
show. That show is just as hypocritical as Wei Jiabo's political show.